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BRIEF OF AMICA CURIAE DEBORAH A. DEMOTT IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
This brief is submitted on behalf of Deborah A. DeMott as amica curiae in support of petitioner. 1
INTEREST OF AMICA CURIAE
Deborah A. DeMott is the David F. Cavers Professor of Law at Duke University where she has been a
member of the law faculty since 1975. Professor DeMott served as the sole Reporter for the American
Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Agency, published in 2006. She is the author of, among other
works, Fiduciary Obligation, Agency and Partnership:
Duties in Ongoing Business Relationships (West,
1991). She has held appointment as the Centennial
Professor in the Law Department of the London
School of Economics and has served as a Fulbright
Senior Scholar at Sydney and Monash Universities in
Australia, and she has been the New Zealand Legal
Research Foundation Visiting Fellow at the University of Auckland, in addition to teaching and lecturing
at other universities in the United States and abroad.
In addition to her scholarship on agency and fiduciary
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amica curiae states that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other
than amica curiae or her counsel has made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. This brief is
filed with the consent of, and timely notice was given to, the Appellate Liaison Committee for Respondents, pursuant to the September 24, 2019, Case Management Order from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (ECF No. 8, Case No. 19-3049
(2d Cir., Sept. 24, 2019)).
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obligation, she has written on corporate law, takeovers, and acquisitions. 2
Amica has no stake in the outcome of this case
other than her academic interest in the logically coherent development of the law. Amica is filing this
brief because the case implicates fundamental doctrines in the common law of agency in relationship to
federal statutes. Amica believes her unique perspective may assist the Court in determining whether to
grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is well settled that Congress legislates against a
backdrop of common law rules that are presumed to
operate unless the statute “speak[s] directly to the
question addressed by the common law.” United
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). This principle includes the common law of agency, and courts—
including this Court—often incorporate definitions
and apply doctrines drawn from agency law. Agency
doctrine, comprehensively articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006), is relatively uniform in
states in the United States and in federal common
law. When nothing in a statutory text displaces otherwise-applicable agency principles, courts apply them
unless the purpose of the statute requires otherwise.
Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003). Bankruptcy
law is no exception. See, e.g., Strang v. Brudner, 114
U.S. 555, 561 (1885) (applying agency doctrine in proceeding under Bankruptcy Act of 1867 to attribute
2 Institutional affiliations are listed for identification purposes
only.
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debt incurred by partner to partnership); Boltz-Rubinstein v. Bank of America, N.A., 624 B.R. 756, 762 n. 5
(E.D. Pa. 2021)(“[o]rdinary state law principles apply”
unless modified by the Bankruptcy Code or an order
from the bankruptcy court.)
Through a novel construction of Section
548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Second Circuit’s opinion in this case destabilizes the application
of well-established agency doctrine. The opinion bypasses agency law altogether in declining to impute
the fraudulent actions, knowledge, and intentions of
senior corporate officers to their corporate principal,
the bankrupt transferor of property. The opinion does
not justify its truncated treatment of imputation by
reference to the text of the Bankruptcy Code, its extensive legislative history, the purposes served by Section 548(a)(1)(A), or longstanding principles (either of
bankruptcy law or agency). Instead, the opinion detours into Delaware corporate law while misstating
its substance and omitting the integral role of agency
law within Delaware corporate jurisprudence.
Under Section 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code, transfers of a debtor’s property—here, Tribune’s
property—made within two years of filing a petition
in bankruptcy are avoidable when made “with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity” to which
the debtor is indebted. Thus, if Tribune (1) shifted assets (2) within two years of its bankruptcy (3) with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors, the
transaction can be avoided.
The only question is whether Tribune’s leveraged
buyout within two years of its bankruptcy involved intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors. Senior
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members of Tribune’s management made misrepresentations of material fact to a Special Committee of
the Tribune’s board, and later, to its solvency-opinion
firm to shift billions of Tribune’s assets in a leveraged
buyout. Management knew their statements were
false and intended that both the board and the firm
would rely on the misrepresentations. Under fundamental principles of agency law, a company’s management speaks for it, and its misrepresentations are imputed to the corporation to establish intent.
The Second Circuit disagreed, necessitating the
petition here. It held that because Tribune’s board had
delegated final approval over any fundamental transaction to its Special Committee—who remained unaware of management’s misrepresentations—Tribune
itself as the debtor was not charged with senior management’s knowledge or fraudulent intent. This analysis contravenes long-established doctrines of agency
law clearly implicated by the text of Section
548(a)(1)(A) and strikes at the heart of the law of
agency. Moreover, the implications of the Second Circuit’s unprecedented approach reach far beyond the
facts of this case—troubling as they are—to widelyaccepted instances in which courts apply agency doctrine. The underlying doctrines, which undergird organizational accountability, are foundational to
agency law as a whole and have long historical lineages. By jettisoning core agency doctrine, the Second
Circuit’s approach facilitates practices that evade accountability and strategically silo information within
organizations. The Second Circuit’s justification for
its decision was a flawed reading of Delaware corporate law to bypass the selfsame agency principles,
which apply there, too. This Court should grant the
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petition for a writ of certiorari to correct the Second
Circuit’s disregard of agency law rules long recognized
by this Court as the background rules for federal statutes.
ARGUMENT
I. This Court has applied agency law to resolve
issues arising under federal statutes
This Court has turned to agency law to resolve issues posed by various federal statutes, including basic
agency doctrines of actual and apparent authority
that delimit when a company is charged with the legal
consequences of an employee’s, officer’s, board’s, or
owner’s actions. See, e.g., Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542 (1999) (interpretation of Title
VII with respect to vicarious liability for punitive
damages “is informed by the general common law of
agency”) (cleaned up); American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982) (apparent authority, “long … the settled rule in
the federal system,” creates private antitrust liability
under Sherman Act for acts of agents). That makes
sense. Imputation of conduct normally is a question of
agency. “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that
arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent
to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act
on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control, and the agent manifests consent or otherwise
consents so to act.” Restatement (Third) of Agency, §
1.01.
The Court presumes that when Congress legislates, it incorporates principles of the common law—
including agency law—when it creates a federal cause
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of action in tort. See Meyer, 537 U.S. at 285; Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
709 (1999). In Section 548(a)(1)(A), Congress created
a federal cause of action for fraud that contains no express or implied carve out of basic common law principles. On the contrary, it incorporates them. See BFP
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540-43 (1994).
It is thus inextricably linked to agency law, in particular to basic doctrines of apparent authority and imputation of an agent’s knowledge and actions to the
principal. See Restatement (Third) of Agency, §§ 2.01,
2.03 (defining actual and apparent authority), 7.08
(actions taken with apparent authority create vicarious liability for torts of misrepresentation such as
fraud).
Under these doctrines, Tribune’s officers acted as
its agents when they materially misinformed the Special Committee and the firm that rendered Tribune’s
solvency opinions. Agency law imputes an officer’s
conduct to the company when an agent acts within the
scope of actual or apparent authority, or within the
scope of employment when the agent is an employee
of the principal. For example, the Court has applied
this principle in the context of civil liability for treble
damages under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., a standard-setting society’s officers
reasonably appeared to act with authority when they
interpreted a safety code in an anticompetitive manner and communicated their interpretation in a letter
to an industry member, who displayed it to potential
customers to thwart a competitor. This Court charged
the society—the officers’ principal—with the legal
consequences of their conduct although the principal
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itself did not ratify their conduct, benefit from it, or
approve it through action of its governing body. 456
U.S. at 570-72. The conduct was imputed to the society regardless of whether others within the organization approved it or had contemporaneous knowledge
of it. The society as principal had “permitted itself to
be used to further the scheme which caused injury to
respondent.” Id. at 578 (Burger, C.J. concurring).
The Court’s decision in Hydrolevel applied the
long-settled doctrine of apparent authority, which imputes the fraudulent acts of an agent that appears to
have authority to engage in such acts to the principal,
regardless of whether the fraud benefits the principal.
Id. at 566. 3 That is supported by a doctrine that imputes notice of material facts to the principal that are
known by the agent. Restatement (Third) of Agency §
5.03. Imputation thereby creates incentives for principals to use care in choosing agents, monitoring them,
and developing effective procedures for the transmission of material facts within the principal’s organization. Imputation also discourages practices that deploy agents as shields to insulate the principal from
notice of inconvenient facts. Id. cmt. b.
Separately, this Court has been alert to the risk
that statutory construction may destabilize the application of broad-reaching legal doctrines when the text

3 The Court noted that “[f]or instance, the principal is liable
for an agent’s fraud though the agent acts solely to benefit himself, if the agent acts with apparent authority….[s]imilarly, a
principal is liable for an agent’s misrepresentations that cause
pecuniary loss to a third person, when the agent acts within the
scope of his apparent authority.” Id.
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of the statute itself is silent on the issue. These include the foundational principles of legal personality
that underlie agency doctrine. In United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), the Court held that a
parent corporation was not liable for its subsidiary’s
debts solely because it owned all the stock in the subsidiary. Thus, the parent was not subject to the subsidiary’s liability under CERCLA. This Court reasoned that “nothing in CERCLA purports to reject this
bedrock principle, and against this venerable common-law backdrop, the Congressional silence is audible.” Id. at 62.
Likewise, this Court modifies or varies the application of an agency law doctrine only when it recognizes such an exception as necessary to a statute’s
purpose, justifying the departure. In its construction
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied
to sexual harassment by supervisory employees in
Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, this Court’s opinion begins with general agency law to determine an
employer’s accountability for its supervisors’ tangible
acts of harassment. 524 U.S. 742, 754-764 (1998). Departing from general agency doctrine, the Court made
affirmative defenses available to employers that take
measures to prevent harassment and enable victims
to report it. Id. at 763-65. The Court explicitly identified these departures from agency doctrines and justified them in light of the statute’s prophylactic objective, finding that it dominated the statute’s other objective of victim compensation. Id. at 764-65; compare
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1995) (where Congress silent, section 523(a)(2)(A) of Bankruptcy Act incorporated common law meaning of “actual fraud”)
with NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
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124–132 (1944) (rejecting agency law conception of
employee where structure and context of National Labor Relations Act indicated broader definition).
Thus, far from ignoring the pervasive salience of
agency doctrine in cases arising under federal statutes, this Court’s opinions ground their analysis in it,
as well as in statutory text. This Court acknowledges
the importance of bedrock legal principles and declines to destabilize them. And it explicitly articulates
justifications for departures from agency doctrines
that are grounded in the relevant statute’s objectives
or purposes.
The opinions discussed above fit into a long and
unbroken lineage for the relevant agency doctrines bypassed without justification by the Second Circuit: apparent authority and imputed knowledge. In 1839,
Justice Story stressed that when an agent’s action is
within the scope of the agent’s general authority the
principal is bound by the agent’s act, even if contrary
to the principal’s instructions. 1 Story, Commentaries
on the Law of Agency, as a Branch of Commercial and
Maritime Jurisprudence, with Occasional Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law § 126 at 115-16
(1st ed. 1839). Equally salient in Story’s account is the
basic principle of imputation: “notice to an agent is notice to the principal himself, where it arises from, or
is at the time connected with, the subject matter of his
agency.” Story, Commentaries § 140 at 131. 4 Five decades later, in his comprehensive treatise Floyd

Story continues, “for, upon general principles of public policy,
it is presumed that the agent has communicated the facts to the
principal, and if he has not, still the principal, having entrusted
4
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Mechem stated that “[i]t is an unbroken rule, settled
by an unbroken current of authority, that notice to an
agent while acting within the scope of his authority
and in reference to a matter over which his authority
extends, is notice to the principal.” Floyd R. Mechem,
A Treatise on the Law of Agency, § 718 at 547 (1st ed.
1889). Mechem also articulated the basic proposition—applied by this Court in Hydrolevel—that an
agent’s fraud results in vicarious liability for the principal: “the proper inquiry is whether the act was done
within the course of the agency and by virtue of the
authority as agent.” Id. § 739 at 576. 5 Under the
Court’s prior decisions, basic agency law is integral to
the common law and is thus incorporated into federal
statutes unless the text or clear purpose of the statute
suggest otherwise.
II. The Second Circuit’s decision substituted a
roadmap for fraud in place of long-established doctrines that further accountability
and compensation for defrauded creditors
The Second Circuit’s opinion bypassed several
well-established agency doctrines applied by this
Court when construing federal statutes via an ill-conceived detour into Delaware law. In consequence, the
Second Circuit’s opinion crafted a roadmap for fraud
on creditors with potentially broad ramifications for
other well-settled applications of agency doctrine.

the agent with the particular business, the other party has the
right to deem his acts obligatory on the principal.” Id.

5 Id. at 576, quoting Reynolds v. Witte, 13 S.C. 5, 7 (1880) (emphasis omitted).
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A. With no justification, the Second Circuit
bypassed relevant and well-settled agency
doctrines
An agent who acts with apparent authority in communicating with third parties, if acting wrongfully,
subjects the principal to liability. Elaborated in Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.08 and in the Court’s
opinion in Hydrolevel, this is a well-established principle of vicarious liability applicable to agents’ frauds
that the Second Circuit entirely ignores. Nothing in
the text of Section 548(a)(1)(A), or the Bankruptcy
Code more generally, ousts its applicability to the
facts of this case. Nor does the Second Circuit’s opinion—unlike those of this Court discussed above—articulate a justification for so substantial a departure
from agency doctrine when the relevant provision of
the Bankruptcy Code is self-evidently concerned to
remedy fraud committed by a debtor against its creditors.
Likewise, as discussed above, agency doctrine imputes notice of facts known to the agent to the principal, subject to exceptions inapplicable here. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03. Imputation doctrine does not require that the knowledgeable agent
be in control of a final decision. Otherwise a principal
could shield itself from inconvenient knowledge about
the means used by its agents to induce third parties
to transact with the principal. Id. § 5.03 cmt. b. When
a principal is an organization, the collective
knowledge of its agents is treated as its knowledge
when it is material to their duties, however the organization may have configured itself. Id. § 5.03, cmt. c.

12
The Second Circuit likewise failed to justify its departure from this bedrock agency principle.
B. The Delaware Detour
Instead of applying these agency principles, the
Second Circuit’s decision effects a novel doctrinal bypass that rests on two misstatements of Delaware corporate law.
First, the Second Circuit wrongly concluded that
“[a] corporation can only act through its directors and
officers.” Pet. App. 15a. Under long-settled Delaware
law, a corporation also acts through its employees and
other agents, with legal consequences for the corporation. For example, when managers interact with third
parties on the corporation’s behalf, their knowledge of
material facts and illicit conduct is imputed to the corporation when innocent third parties sue the corporation. See, e.g., In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Consol.
Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 887 (2009), aff’d sub
nom. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Gen. Re Corp, 11
A.3d 228 (Del. 2010).
Second, the court focused on “the powers of corporate directors” under Delaware law and mistakenly
deemed “control” a prerequisite for imputation. Pet.
App. 16a. Tribune’s directors had delegated final decision-making authority to a Special Committee of independent directors, who lacked “actual intent” to harm
its creditors. Id. The Second Circuit found that only
the directors had authority to act for the corporation
and fraudulent transfers could be imputed only to parties who had “control” over the disposition of the
transferred property. Id. But the Delaware statutory
provisions cited by the Second Circuit do not confer
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sole power on directors to approve extraordinary
transactions, such as mergers and sales of substantially all assets. See Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger) and 271 (sale of assets). Instead, the relevant Delaware statutory provisions require much else, in particular approval by a majority of the shares with
power to vote on fundamental transactions. Each requisite step has independent significance. See Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (1985) (directors may
not abdicate duty to act in informed manner by leaving decision to stockholders). Thus, under the Second
Circuit’s “control” test, no one could have the requisite
intent absent a broad, ham-handed conspiracy. And
the Second Circuit mistook Delaware’s rule on imputation, drawing its “control” test from an inapposite
context: when the transferee controls the transferor.
Pet. App. 16a (citing In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978,
984 (1st Cir. 1983)). Even if—contrary to Delaware
law—fundamental transactions required only approval from directors, the officers’ knowledge should
be imputed under the common law agency principles
that Delaware corporate law incorporates, as discussed above.
C. The Roadmap for Fraud
The Second Circuit’s opinion does not justify the
outcomes enabled by its erroneous Delaware detour.
Facilitating illicit transfers by insolvent debtors
through the machinations of corrupt insiders, the Second Circuit’s opinion undercuts the broad-reaching
impact of long-established agency law. Likewise, the
Second Circuit’s opinion does not justify its departure
from an “unbroken current of authority,” Mechem, su-
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pra, § 718 at 547, through construing either the Bankruptcy Code’s relevant text or its policy objectives.
Conditioning proof of fraudulent intent on the scienter
of a committee of directors who are unaware of the
fraud, the “detour” creates strong incentives to shelter
those directors from knowing the truth and to populate the committee with incurious members. More
generally, as discussed above, agency principles are
integral to this Court’s jurisprudence in many contexts involving the application of federal statutes. The
Second Circuit’s opinion destabilizes it. Its Delaware
detour simplistically truncates Delaware law to jettison “unbroken rules” of agency law long applied by
this Court in an “unbroken current of authority.”
Mechem, supra, § 718 at 547.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
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